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Abstract—Anonymous communication networks are impor-
tant building blocks for online privacy protection. One approach
to achieve anonymity is to relay messages through multiple
routers, where each router shuffles messages independently. To
achieve anonymity, at least one router needs to be honest.
In the presence of an adversary that is controlling a subset
of the routers unbiased routing is important for guaranteeing
anonymity. However, the routing strategy also influenced other
factors such as the scalability and the performance of the system.
One solution is to use a fixed route for relaying all messages
with many routers. If the route is not fixed the routing decision
can either be made by the communication initiator or the
intermediate routers. However, the existing routing types each
have limitations. For example, one faces scalability issues when
increasing the throughput of systems with fixed routes. Moreover,
when the routing decision is left to the initiator, the initiator
needs to maintain an up-to-date view of the system at all times,
which also does not scale. If the routing decision is left to
intermediate routers the routing of the communication can be
influenced by an adversary. In this work, we propose a novel
multiparty routing approach for anonymous communication that
addresses these shortcomings. We distribute the routing decision
and verify the correctness of routing to achieve routing integrity.
More concretely, we provide a mixnet design that uses our routing
approach and that in addition, addresses load balancing. We show
that our system is secure against a global active adversary.
Keywords—Anonymous Communication; Mixnets; Routing;
Privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Anonymous communication networks (ACNs) provide se-
cure communication channels that hide not only data contents
but also the communications’ metadata, thus providing protec-
tion against traffic analysis. By routing data through multiple
proxies, ACNs prevent network eavesdroppers from linking the
source and destination of messages. Furthermore, ACNs enable
senders to communicate with potentially malicious destinations
without revealing their identity or location.
ACNs are typically overlay networks consisting of a set
of dedicated routers, also called relays, that are connected
via the Internet. The first ACN design in the early 1980s [1]
introduced the concept of mixes for implementing anonymous
email. These mixes are relays that collect a batch of N equal-
size messages, cryptographically transform them, and output
them in a re-shuffled form, so that the output messages cannot
be traced to their corresponding inputs based on message
content, size, timing or order. The best known ACN is Tor [2].
The Tor network is an ACN that consists of about seven
thousands relays run by volunteers, and provides service to
an estimated two million daily users who use it primarily to
anonymously browse the web [3]. Other examples of ACN
networks include for example Mixminion [4] an anonymous
re-mailer, Freenet [5], [6] used for anonymous file-sharing, and
DC-Nets [7] that can be deployed for broadcast applications
such as group messaging.
The goal of ACNs is to anonymize communications by
relaying them over multiple routers. There are three main types
of anonymous routing in terms of how routers are chosen to
form the path.
First, in deterministic routing, the paths are predetermined
by the system configuration. Chaum’s original ACN pro-
posal [1] considered a sequence of mixes organized in a
cascade. Systems that adopted the cascade network topology
in their designs include JAP [8], and voting systems, such as
Helios [9]. An advantage of cascades is that routing headers are
unnecessary, since the next hop in the path is predetermined.
Cascades however, are of limited practicality due to their poor
scalability, limited anonymity, and lack of resilience to router
failures [10].
Second, in source routing, the full path is chosen by the
initiator of the communication. This is the routing used by
Tor [2] and by anonymous remailers such as Mixmaster [11]
and Mixminion [4]. In comparison to cascades, source routing
is more resilient against failures of routers [12]; it is more
scalable, meaning that the network can grow to accommodate
more users; and consequently, can provide better anonymity to
those users.
However, an important requirement in source routing is
that the initiator must have a full view of the network, since
otherwise partial network knowledge can be exploited by an
adversary to fingerprint and identify users based on which
relays they choose [13]. As a consequence, all users need
to periodically download the full list of currently available
routers, their addresses, public keys, and other routing-relevant
information. This is a major bottleneck for the scalability of
the network, particularly if the routers have a high churn – as
is often the case in peer-to-peer networks.
Third, in hop-by-hop routing each router locally decides on
the next router of the path. Hop-by-hop routing is advantageous
over source routing because it does not require entities to
maintain an up-to-date view of the full network, as well as
allows for better load balancing. The main disadvantage of
hop-by-hop routing is that it is vulnerable to route capture
attacks, where a malicious relay can gain full control over the
route of a message, so that it is relayed through adversarial
relays [14]. The earliest ACN employing hop-by-hop routing
is Crowds [15], and another example is Morphmix [16], which
uses witnesses to mitigate route capture attacks.
In this paper we propose multiparty routing, a novel type
of anonymous routing that broadens the design space with a
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fourth kind of routing. Our solution comes with important
advantages over the previous routing approaches. Multiparty
routing offers a scalability advantage over source routing: in
our proposal the communication initiators need to only know
one (or a small number) of routers, compared to the full view
required in source routing. At the same time, we prevent the
route capture attacks of hop-by-hop routing by decentralizing
the routing decision using a multiparty computation technique.
In addition to anonymity, our protocol guarantees the integrity
of both shuffles and routing, which is novel for ACNs.
Our main contribution is a concrete multiparty routing
protocol that employs cryptographic primitives, such as com-
mitment schemes, signatures, and cryptographic hash func-
tions. We combine our routing protocol with a mix network
that employs provable shuffles, threshold decryption, and
re-randomizable encryption to realize secure and verifiable
anonymous communication, and load balancing. Our solution
achieves security against global active adversaries and offers
improved resilience and scalability against relay failures com-
pared to deterministic and source routing. We achieve close
to optimal load balancing by integrating relevant information
about the throughput of relays into the routing strategy. Our
protocol is a mid-latency anonymous communication network
and thus can be deployed for applications that are more tolerant
to latency such as anonymous wiki, micro-blogging, voting,
and auctions.
II. RELATED WORK
Golle and Juels introduced Parallel Mixes [17], an ACN
that uses both deterministic and hop-by-hop routing in two
different phases that they call rotation and distribution phases,
respectively. Typical configurations start with a rotation phase,
then go through a distribution phase, and finish with a rotation
phase. During a rotation phase, mixes exchange their entire
output ciphertexts with another mix in a rotating fashion (that
is, the first mix passes its ciphertexts to the second, and so on,
and the last mix passes them to the first). In the distribution
phase, each mix splits output ciphertexts among other mixes.
Our routing protocol has similarities with the distribution phase
of Parallel Mixes, but takes away one primary requirement of
Parallel Mixes: Parallel Mixes require that in the distribution
phase mixes must not be aware of the sender of any of
the ciphertexts. Consequently, users have to submit input
ciphertexts uniformly to the system and ciphertexts have to
be mixed by at least one honest mix during the rotation phase.
This is necessary to prevent route-capture attacks, because
mixes in the distribution phase are free to choose how to
distribute their output ciphertexts to other mixes (contrary to
our protocol, where this decision is made jointly by multiple
entities). However, these countermeasures are still insufficient
when the adversary controls a fraction of the messages going
through the network, as shown by an attack by Borisov [18].
Movahedi et al. [19] proposed a multiparty shuffling
protocol that allows multiple parties to jointly compute a
private random permutation of input messages. The parties
that perform the multiparty shuffling protocol are split up into
quorums that use a sorting scheme on inputs that have been
shared among the quorum to achieve random permutation.
While the approach is resilient to parties aborting the protocol
or dropping out because of technical difficulties, there is
no mechanism for preventing traffic tampering before the
shuffling starts. Therefore, parties who hold user inputs at
the beginning of the shuffling can replace them with arbitrary
adversarial inputs. The approach is therefore only suitable for
passive adversary. Furthermore, this scheme requires that the
links between honest parties must be private and cannot be
observed by the adversary; and the adversary needs to be static,
meaning it cannot corrupt alternative parties once the protocol
is running.
III. GOALS, ASSUMPTIONS, AND SYSTEM
ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we describe the security model, the goals of
the system, the entities and their roles, and the threat model.
A. Adversary Model
We assume a global adversary that can monitor all the
communication links between entities in the system, includ-
ing channels from users to the system and vice versa. The
adversary is active, meaning that it can corrupt a subset of
entities in the system, as well as submit messages herself. We
assume that all cryptographic primitives are secure and cannot
be broken by the adversary. Our protocol does not enforce
restrictions on how many users need to be honest. However, a
user is anonymous only among honest users that submitted
messages to the network during the same time frame, and
whose messages have traversed at least one honest relay.
B. Goals of the System
The goal of our system are as follows:
• Anonymity: the adversary must not be able to link a
message leaving the system to the user who sent it,
provided that the message has traversed at least one honest
relay. This goal is equivalent to sender anonymity that has
been defined by Pfitzmann et al. [20].
• Routing Integrity: the adversary must not be able to influ-
ence the route followed by a message, and consequently
cannot bias the routing by forcing the data to only traverse
adversarial relays.
• Availability: the system must be robust to the adversarial
removal of relays, and output all messages even if some
relays are taken down once the routing has started.
• Load-balancing: we aim at providing load balancing such
that relays route an amount of traffic that is proportional
to their throughput.
C. Entities and Roles
We consider a broadcast channel that we call bulletin
board. Although the bulletin board is readable by all parties
in the system: users and servers, users can not write into it.
Our system comprises a set of users and dedicated servers
as depicted in Fig. 1. The users in the system want to send mes-
sages anonymously, whereas the servers cooperate with each
other to achieve secure anonymous routing. We distinguish
between three sets of servers: R - relays, RE - routing entities,
and AS- auditing servers. The relays R are mixes that relay
messages via publishing ciphertext messages on the bulletin
board and fetching them. More precisely, the mixes first collect
from the bulletin board their set of input ciphertexts, then re-
encrypt and shuffle those, a process referred to as mixing, and
then relay their outputs to the bulletin board, so that each of
them can be retrieved by the next mix in the path. The relays
are organized in l sequential layers formed by disjoint subsets
of R.
The second set of servers are called routing entities RE .
These are responsible for computing the joint randomness that
is used in the routing process.
The third set of servers are the auditors (auditing servers)
AS. Auditors are responsible for: 1. generating and broadcast-
ing the public encryption key; 2. verifying the correctness of
message shuffling and routing and 3. final message decryption.
For clarity, we keep the roles of auditors and routing
entities separate from mixes. However, from a practical point
of view all three roles can be carried out by the same set of
severs.
Fig. 1. This figure depicts the roles of all actors (user, mixes, ruting entities,
auduting servers) as a message is relayed through the system.
Next, we briefly review the required cryptographic building
blocks and proceed by describing our protocol.
D. Cryptographic Building Blocks
Next, we review relevant cryptographic building blocks.
Public Key Encryption and Signing We assume the
reader is familiar with the principles of pubic key encryption
and signature schemes. In our protocol, we employ a variant
of public key encryption, referred to as threshold decryption
[21], [22], which allows for the decryption to be carried out
by a quorum of participants (the auditors in our scheme).
More precisely, our scheme uses a distributed key generation
protocol KeyGen, such as the ones of [23], [24]. It generates a
public key which is made available to all users of the system,
while the corresponding secret key is distributed to all the
auditors AS in a secret shared form. During the decryption
protocol Dec a threshold of the secret key share holders
(auditors) jointly decrypt the input ciphertext. This process can
be can be realized either with a trusted dealer, such as in the
work of [25], or without [26], [27].
To conceal how ciphertexts traverse a mix, we use re-
randomizable encryption, such as ElGamal [28]. This allows
a mix to update the randomness of the traversing ciphertexts.
We propose standard cryptographic signatures, such as [29],
for the routing verification.
Shuffle and Correctness of Shuffling A shuffle algo-
rithm Shuffle implements a permutation on its inputs. In
our protocol we use shuffles to permute the ciphertexts to
conceal their ordering. To guarantee the correct execution of
the shuffling algorithm we apply a proof of correct shuffling
which is realized by a zero-knowledge (ZK) proof systems.
In our scheme, given a set of pre-shuffling and post-shuffling
ciphertexts, a prover (the mix) needs to prove to a verifier
(the auditors or, in case the auditor role is carried out by
mixes, other mixes) that the set of post-shuffling ciphertexts is
a re-randomization of the set of the pre-shuffling ciphertexts
(without revealing the permutation and the re-randomization
randomness used by Shuffle). Our protocol utilizes non-
interactive variants of ZK proofs, such as the ones proposed
in [30] [31].
IV. OUR MULTIPARTY ROUTING PROTOCOL
A. System Overview
As mentioned before, mixes are divided into a number of
subsets (layers). Messages are relayed by one mix from each
layer of the system. Therefore, each message is relayed by a set
of mixes. Users send their messages to an arbitrary mix from
the first layer of mixes R1. Only messages that are submitted
within the same time frame are mixed with each other. Hence,
a user is only anonymous among honest users that submitted
their messages at the same time frame.
Each relay mixes all message it receives. The next mix is
determined in a hop-by-hop fashion. However, the mixes do
not have freedom to choose to which mixes they send any given
output message. The routing entities, RE , determine how each
message is routed by jointly producing the randomness used
for the routing; this process, called Multiparty Routing, can be
summarized as follows.
1) All routing entities choose privately a random number
and use a commitment scheme to commit to their random
numbers on the bulletin board.
2) After all routing entities have committed to their random
numbers, they all open their commitments.
3) The random numbers are combined to produce a joint
random number.
4) This random number is used to compute the routing
assignment of the ciphertext messages to the mixes in
the next layer in proportion to their capacity/throughput.
This procedure is carried out for the output of each mix.
In parallel to this, the auditing servers need to verify the
correctness of the shuffling and routing. After a message has
been mixed by a mix from each layer and the auditing servers
successfully verify the correctness of all routing and shuffling
processes the message is delivered to the intended recipient of
the message. If at least one of the mixes that has relayed the
message is honest, the adversary cannot trace back a message
leaving the network to any particular sender.
Figure 2 shows the topology for a network that has four lay-
ers (disjoint subset) of mixes. After processing input messages,
the MPR protocol assigns output messages to mixes in the next
layer; meaning that a portion of the output messages of each
mix is assigned to mixes in the next layer in proportion to the
throughput of those mixes within their own layer. Hence, the
Fig. 2. In this figure we present an example of how mixes can be arranged
for our protocol when the protocol consists of 4 layers. The throuput of all
layers needs to be equal, meaning that the total throughput of mixes 1, 2, 3
needs to be equal to the total throuput of the mixes 4, 5, and the total throuput
of the mixes 6, 7, 8, ad the total throuput of the mixes 9, 10. For example,
the output ciphertexts from mix 1 are either assigned to mixes 4 or mix 5.
routing pattern between the mixes follows a stratified topology
as investigated by Diaz et al. [32].
B. Main Protocol
We denote the set of users by U . The set R of relays is
divided into l layers formed by mutually exclusive subsets Ri
with the union
⋃l
i=1Ri = R. An individual mix is denoted
by r.
The bulletin board contains lists of routing and verification
information (input and output ciphertexts, corresponding sig-
natures, commitments and their corresponding openings), and
NIZK proofs of shuffles, grouped and indexed by ctr going
from 1 to l).
Encryption: The auditors (auditing servers) AS are
responsible for the generation of the encryption key pke.
Each auditing server has only a share of the private key
{skdAS1 , ..., skdASd} where |AS| = d. Only qualified subsets
of the auditing servers can jointly decrypt ciphertexts using
their private key shares.
The protocol starts with each user encrypting her message
m together with its intended receiver under the public key pke
(known to all users) and sending the corresponding ciphertext
to an arbitrary mix of R1. The set of ciphertexts that enter the
system in the same time (by all senders) is denoted by C0.
Our system mixes ciphertexts in multiple layers with layer Ri
producing the ciphertext set Ci. After completing l layers the
protocol terminates with a verification step and the decryption
of Cl.
Mixing: Once a subset of the ciphertexts are assigned
to a mix r the mixing and routing take place. Mixes in the
first layer receive ciphertexts from users, while mixes for other
layers take ciphertexts from the bulletin board. The mixing
consists of the re-encryption of the ciphertext inputs and their
shuffling by a random permutation φ.
After the output ciphertexts have been submitted to the bul-
letin board, the next mix to shuffle a ciphertext is determined
by the following routing assignment procedure.
Routing Assignment: We use a coin-tossing protocol
such as [33] to obtain joint randomness. In the coin-tossing
protocol the routing entities commit to their randomness using
a cryptographic commitment schemes. Once the commitments
are opened and the random strings are revealed on the bul-
letin board, a simple function, e.g. bitwise XOR or modular
addition, is applied to obtain the joint randomness Rand.
Then we apply a function Assign on Rand. Assign
then outputs the next layer mix index assignment list L =
(z1, . . . , zw) with k elements in correspondence with the
capacity/thoughput of these mixes.
We give an example instantiation of Assign via the two
procedures H and Map in Appendix A in Algorithms 2 and 3.
The example in Figure 3 to illustrates the routing assign-
ment. Let us have a relay which outputs ciphertexts c1, c2, c3
and the next layer of relays consist of two relays r1, r2 with
corresponding capacities b1 = 1, b2 = 2. By applying Assign
we want to determine which relays in the layer receive which
ciphertexts. Namely, for an output vector of indices (z1 = 2,
z2 = 1, z3 = 2) output by Assign the outgoing ciphertext is
going to be fetched in the next step as follows. In our case, r1
will then fetch the first 11+2 =
1
3 of the outgoing ciphertexts,
namely cz1 = c2, and r2 fetches the rest
2
1+2 =
2
3 ciphertexts,
cz2 = c1 and cz3 = c3 respectively.
Fig. 3. This figure depicts how the ciphertexts c1, c2, c3 from our example
are assigned to the mixes r1 and r2.
Proof of Mixing and Routing: The correctness of the
mixing process is accommodated by the bulletin board. After
mixing the set of input and corresponding set of output
ciphertexts the mix needs to sign input and output cipher-
texts. For signing, both the routing and mixing, R use their
signing private key sks. The corresponding verifying pub-
lic key pkv is available to all parties for later verification
purposes. These keys are used as long-term keys, unlike
(pke, (skd1, . . . , skdd)) that are issued fresh for each time-
frame.
Then, to prove correctness of protocol execution each mix
needs to post on the bulletin board: a) inputs and outputs and
their corresponding signatures, and b) a non-interactive zero-
knowledge (NIZK) proof of correct mixing. Also, the bulletin
board maintains the commitments for the randomness used
for the MPR routing algorithm and their subsequent openings
posted by the routing entities.
Verification and Decryption: Ciphertext which have
passed through all layers are decrypted by the auditing servers
upon successful verification of the correctness of: 1) Mixing
and 2) Routing.
After all mixes in a layer published their results on the
bulletin board, the auditing servers verify their mixing process
by verifying all NIZK proofs on the bulletin board. Moreover,
the auditing servers carry out routing verification on the
input/output ciphertext signed on the bulletin board for each
layer as soon as input ciphertexts for the next layer start being
published to the bulletin board. The routing verification takes
the randomness (commitments openings) and computes the
assignment for the next mix layer. Then, correct routing is con-
firmed by verifying that the computed assignment corresponds
to the correct input and output ciphertexts in the bulletin board.
With Algorithm 4 we give an example instantiation of the
routing verification algorithm in Appendix B.
If routing or mixing verification fails, meaning that a mix
has taken wrong ciphertext as input or produced an invalid
NIZK proof, the auditing servers record the verification failure
of the corresponding mix on the bulletin board. If routing and
mixing of a mix does not verify the routing entities generate a
fresh Rand to assign the input ciphertexts from the mix that
has performed wrong routing to the remaining mixes in his
layer. All remaining output ciphertexts in the layer need to
wait until this stage is carried out to be routed to next layers.
The integrity and authenticity of bulletin board submissions
is verified by the use of the signatures schemes. In our protocol
we use randomized algorithms and with $← we denote the
randomized output generation, so $← Sw samples randomly
from all permutations of size w and s refers to the randomness
used by the ciphertext re-randomization algorithms.
Our protocol is summarized in Algorithm 1.
C. Parameter Choices
Our protocol has similarities to parallel mixing in terms
of distributing ciphertexts among a set of mixes, hence, we
revisit suggested parameters by the literature and adopt these
parameters for our system.
The number of mixes that relay the ciphertexts, or so-called
path length, is an important aspect of our system because it
determines how many times a batch of ciphertexts C is re-
arranged. The path length has a direct effect on whether a
ciphertext batch C entering the system is fully mixed with the
other batches entering at the same time. Our result confirms
the intuition that a larger number of layers leads to a better
mixing.
For a passive adversary, Czumaj shows that the path length
in any switching networks should be log n, where n is the total
number of mixes in the system [34] [35]. Similarly, Klonowski
et al. [36] have also shown that in parallel mixing the number
of distribution steps should be log n.
For an active adversary, Klonowski [36] shows that the
number of mixing layers must depend on the number of mes-
sages that are relayed through the system. Similarly, Goodrich
and Mitzenmacher [37] have shown that if some mixes are
controlled by an active adversary then the number of layers
needs to be logN where N is the number of input messages
in a given time frame.
Since, we are considering an active adversary we set the
number of layers to logN . For example, if we assume the
routing of 1000 messages our system needs at least 3 layers
where each layer has the throughput to relay 1000 messages.
For relaying 100,000 messages the system needs to have at
least 5 layers where each layer has the throughput to relay
100,000.messages. To improve availability each layer should
have at least two mixes.
Algorithm 1 Multiparty Routing
Setup
Auditing servers AS generate encryption keys:
(pke, skdAS1 , ..., skdASd)
$← KeyGen
publish (pke) to bulletin board
Encrypt
Each sender:
c
$← Encpke(receiver’s address,m)
sends c to r ∈ R1
ctr ← 1
while ctr ≤ l do
Mixing and Prove Mixing
Each r ∈ Rctr , with inputs C = {c1, . . . , cw} and φ $← Sw:
shuffles Cφ $← Shuffle(C, φ)
re-encrypts (C′, s) $← ReEnc(Cφ)
Each r ∈ Rctr:
computes pi $← ProveNIZK(C,C′;φ, s)
publish pi to bulletin board
publish (Signskvr (C), Signskvr (C
′), C, C′)
to the bulletin board
Next hop and Prove Routing
For each r ∈ Rctr , all v routing entities RE :
publish Com(rand1), . . . , Com(randv) to the bulletin board
publish rand1, . . . , randv to the bulletin board
For each rout ∈ Rctr , each r ∈ Rctr+1 computes:
Rand← SUM(rand1, . . . , randv)
(z1, . . . , zw)←Assign(Rand)
For i = 1 to w rzi ∈ Rctr+1 fetch ci
Verify Mixing and Routing
For each r ∈ Rctr , a threshold z of auditing servers AS runs
VerifyNIZK(Cr, C
′
r, pir)
Verifypkvr (Signsksr (Cr),Cr)
Verifypkvr (Signsksr (C
′
r),C′r)
and computes
VerifyRouting(Randr, C
′
r,Rctr+1)
ctr ← ctr + 1
end while
Decrypt
Each r ∈ Rl:
sends all c′ to AS
For a threshold z of auditing servers AS:
if Verify Mixing and Routing is successful for all layers
decrypts (receiver’s address,m)← Decskd1,...skdz (c′)
otherwise returns an error
send m to receiver from U
Furthermore, to increase the cost of an adversary we
assume that mixes are set up across distinct IP subnets by
multiple organizations or institutions. For example, an organi-
zation can offer more than one mix for the network, however,
all mixes of an organization need to be in the same layer. This
is important because otherwise a message can be effectively
mixed by a single organization.
Another important parameter is the capacity or throughput
of the mixes. From a load balancing point of view the total
throughput of mixes in each layer needs to be equal in order
to prevent any congestion in our system.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section we start by revisiting the security properties
of interest and go on to analyze the security of our protocol
based on those security goals against a global, active adversary.
We show that an active adversary in our solution has no
advantage over a passive one.
Security Properties:
• Routing Integrity: guarantees that an active adversary is
not able to influence the routing decision to deanonymize
messages by forcing them to route through adversarial
mixes.
• Routing Correctness: guarantees the detection of ma-
licious routing and subsequently only correctly routed
messages leaving the system.
• Anonymity (routing confidentiality): guarantees that the
adversary cannot find the relationship between messages
leaving the system and a user sending a message to the
system, provided that the message has traversed at least
some honest mixes.
• Availability: guarantees that the protocol is robust against
removal of a subset of entities by an adversary and that
the messages entering the system will be output by the
system in the face of such attacks.
A. Routing Integrity
To address the integrity property we answer the following
question: Can a malicious mix (or a subset of mixes) influence
the routing of a ciphertext c to a mix of his choice rA? We
investigate two ways of manipulating the routing decision.
The first way deals with adversaries who try to influence the
shuffling procedure. This attack path is however not possible
in our protocol because all mixes publish their shuffled cipher-
texts before the routing decision (Rand outcome) is revealed.
The second way to manipulate the routing decision is through
adversarial bias in the computation of the joint randomness
Rand.
More concretely, we investigate the advantage of an active
adversary A who gains control over a subset of routing entities
denoted as REA. In order to influence the routing decision
A has to be able to bias the computation of Rand where
Rand = Randhonest + randA is the mod sum addition of
the random numbers from all honest entities Randhonest and
the adversarially controlled randomness randA. The goal of
A is to produce a new rand′A, such that the updated sum
Rand′ = Randhonest + rand′A fits its routing purposes: the
target ciphertext is routed to rA where A’s capacity/throughput
is b/B. In our protocol all routing entities RE first need to
commit to their random numbers and only then reveal the
openings of their commitments. A has control only over its
own commitment T = Com(rand′A) and the corresponding
opening rand′A. The best strategy for A is to wait for the
openings of all honest routing entities and then reveal his own
rand′A.
Since A does not know in advance the openings of the
honest routing entities, A needs to ‘predict’ in advance a valid
rand′A, such that T = Com(rand
′
A)). Our assumption here
is that Com is a secure scheme against collision, preimage
and second preimage attacks. Under this assumption A’s best
strategy is to perform precomputation to find the largest set of
preimages N with |N | = n mapping to a commitment value
T . Then, once A commits to T , he ‘hopes’ that the needed
randomness for his routing purposes rand′A belongs to the
precomputed set N . Then, what is left to find is the size of
the set of valid randomness values V for the routing purposes
of A. Since the adversary controls b/B of the throughput
w ciphertexts, then the set of valid values V amounts to
2|Rand|
w × bB ×w where 2
|Rand|
w is the fraction of random values
resulting in a given router assignment as defined by our routing
algorithm. Finally, the probability that A’s set of precomputed
values N ends up intersecting with one of the valid random
values rand′A is
n
2|Rand|×b/B . In other words,
n
2|Rand|×b/B
amounts to the probability that Com−1(T ) = rand′A where
rand′A = (Rand
′ −Randhonest) ∈ V ∩ N .
Note that, as we assumed, if Com is collision secure, finding
n = 2 values takes already precomputation time of birthday
bound complexity 2|Rand|/2. This means that unless A has a
precomputational power of order 2|Rand|/2 its success proba-
bility in biasing the joint randomness Rand is 1
2|Rand|×b/B .
Furthermore, if the adversary removes the mix that c is
assigned to to force a new routing assignment his chances to
be assigned to c are increasing only if he removes a large
proportion of throughput of the layer of rA.
B. Routing Correctness
In this scenario we investigate if a mix can unnoticeably
deviate from the routing assignment. The adversary goal
(acting as one of the mixes R) is to get a ciphertext of his
choice regardless of the ciphertext’s next hop assignment. To
achieve her goal the adversary here needs to manipulate the
routing verification. To do so the adversary needs to control a
subset of the auditing entities that read the routing information
from the bulletin board and carry out the verification. But this
is impossible in our protocol because this adversarial behavior
is going to be discovered in the routing verification phase if at
least one of the auditing servers is honest. Remember that one
of the tasks of the auditing servers is the verification of the
correct input/output ciphertext routing and their signatures.
C. Anonymity
The adversary’s aim is to trace the path of a ciphertext c
until it leaves the system. To link an input ciphertext to an
output ciphertext the adversary needs to control all mixes that
have relayed the input ciphertext. Otherwise, if at least one
mix on the ciphertext’s route is honest, the adversary will not
be able to trace this link. Hence, our adversary needs to control
at least one mix in each layer of the system. Our decision to
follow a stratified topology disallows the adversary to gain any
advantage from placing his efforts (i.e. throughput) unevenly
as compared to balancing out its efforts for each layer. For
example, if an adversary controls 20 % of the total throughput
of the system, we assume that he is in fact controlling a 20 %
of the throughput of the mixes in each layer.
To estimate the probability that a ciphertext follows a fixed
path, denoted by c → p, then we just need to multiply the
probability of that ciphertext being routed by the individual
mixes in each layer of the path. Let us assume that a path p
consists of an order list of mixes p = {r1, r2, . . . , rl}, where
l is the number of layers of the system.
Pr[c→ p] =
l∏
i=1
bi
B
.
Moreover, the probability of choosing each of the mixes in a
path is computed as follows. where bi is the relative throughput
of the mix r compared to the total throughput B of all mixes
(recall that it is the same for all layers). If all mixes in the
subset have the same capacity b, then Pr[c→ p] = ( bB )l
We are interested in the probability that a ciphertext
is routed only by adversarial mixes because this leads to
deanonymize the ciphertext leaving the system by the adver-
sary. We compare the probability that the ciphertext relayed
by our MPR protocol is only routed through adversarial
mixes to to the probability that the ciphertext relayed by
regular parallel mixing system is only relayed by adversarial
mixes. Figure 4 shows the probability that a ciphertext routed
through only adversarial mixes, for our MPR protocol and
for parallel mixes system, when the adversary is controlling
0.1%, 0.15%, 0.20%, 0.25%, 0.30%, 0.35%, and 0.40% of the
throughput in each layer of the system. For this figure we
assume the system has 4 layers. When regular parallel mixing
is used the probability that a ciphertext is only routed along
adversarial mixes is in proportion to the resources of the
adversary. While if our MPR protocol is used, this probability
is increasing much slower due to the fact that adversarial mixes
cannot steer ciphertexts toward further adversarial mixes.
Figure 5 shows the probability that a ciphertext is routed
through only adversarial mixes, for our MPR protocol and for
regular parallel mixes system, when the system has 3, 4, 5, 6,
or 7 layers. We assume for this figure that the adversary
is controlling 0.25% of the throughput of each layer of the
system. If regular parallel mixing is used, the probability that
a ciphertext is only routed along adversarial mixes is constant
and equal to the proportion of adversarial mixes irrespective
of the number of layers. Wile when our MPR protocol is used,
this probability is significantly lower compared to parallel
mixes even when the system consists of only 3 layers. This
probability decreases further as the number of layers in the
system increases.
Moreover, recall that in Parallel Mixes it is required to
distribute the input messages uniformly before submitting
them to the system to decrease the chances of carrying out
attacks such as blending attacks. However, permuting incoming
messages before entering the system to obtain a uniform
Fig. 4. This figure depicts the probability of a message being routed through
mixes that are all controlled by the adversary and shows that this probability
increases for stronger adversaries in MPR and in parallel mixing. For both
MPR and regular parallel mixing the system has 4 layers. The adversary is
controlling mixes in each layer by a proportion of 0.1, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25, 0.30,
0.35, 0.40.
Fig. 5. This figure depicts the probability of a message being routed through
mixes that are all controlled by the adversary and shows that this probability
increases when the system has more layers of mixing. In both MPR and regular
parallel mixing, the adversary is controlling 0.25 of mixes of each layer.
distribution would need another randomly distributing mech-
anism and complicates the trust model. Furthermore, Parallel
Mixes require two rotating phases before and after a single re-
distribution phase where the input ciphertexts are rotated m+1
times, where m is the number of malicious mixes. Using MPR
there is no need to enter only uniformly distributed messages
to the system and the rotating phases of Parallel Mixes can
be eliminated; this allows to use multiple distribution phases
instead of only one, which contributes to obtaining a complete
random permutation of all ciphertexts.
D. Availability
The goal of the adversary is to take out stakeholders of the
protocol in order to obstruct the protocol from running.
There is a restriction on how many mixes, routing entities,
and auditors the adversary can take out. Taking out auditors,
AS is least beneficial, because the attack is not resulting in any
advantage for the adversary. While taking out routing entities,
RE increases the adversary’s success in biasing routing to a
very small extent. Taking out mixes will not abrupt the protocol
execution but leads to traffic congestion. Below we investigate
the effect of removing each type of entity from the system.
Routing entities RE : If the routing entity fails before
committing to a random number the protocol continues to
operate as long as it is assumed that at least one honest routing
entity has remained. If the routing entity fails after committing
to a random number it is considered an abortion, although it
might have been a system failure. If this happens more than
once, the remaining routing entities vote the corresponding
routing out.
Auditors AS: If a limited number of auditors fail to carry
out the distributed decryption, then the protocol is guaranteed
to continue execution because we are using threshold cryp-
tography. To carry out the routing and mixing verification the
only restriction is that at least one remaining auditor is not
controlled by the adversary.
MixesR: Our protocol is resilient to the failure of a number
of mixes and preserves load balanced among the remaining
mixes. We describe how the protocol recovers after the failure
of a mix or a number of mixes in different positions as follows.
1) If a mix fails at the first layer after the users have sent
their ciphertexts the users machine needs to notice in the
bulletin board that her ciphertext is not in the input of any
of the entry mixes and send their ciphertext to another
entry mix.
2) If the adversary takes out all mixes in the first layer the
user’s machine will notice that the ciphertext sent by her
is not in the bulletin board and the auditors notice the
absence of any output from the first layer and introduce
new entry points for the users.
3) If a mix fails at one of the layers except of the first
layer before generating the output ciphertext and the
corresponding routing information, the auditors notice this
and inform the routing entities to generate a new Rand
that assigns the input ciphertext of the failed mix to the
remaining mixes in its layer.
4) If the adversary takes out all mixes in one layers except
of the first layer, the auditors inform the next layer of
mixes to take over with fresh random numbers.
VI. DISCUSSION
Decentralization Advantages: MPR decentralizes the
routing decision which leads to several advantages over a
routing decision that is not decentralized. Troncoso et al. [38]
present numerous advantages of decentralization in protocol
design such as increasing the adversaries cost and facilitating
public verifiability. Our MPR protocol also increases the
cost of the adversary for attacking the routing integrity and
facilitates public verifiability.
Latency We estimate for a system with 9 mixes having
equal throughput, arranged in 3 layers each layer having the
throughput to relay 900 messages, and where 1000 messages
were sent to the system, messages takes about 20 seconds
to traverse the system. This is, however, only a preliminary
result tested on a Intel Xeon E5-2640 CPU, 2.50 GHz machine
with 24 cores, where all computation are performed online. If
some of the computations are made offline the latency can
improve further. Increasing the input traffic and consequently
the number of layers of the system strengthens anonymity,
but also increases the latency. There is a trade-off between
latency and anonymity. Our system offers almost optimal load
balancing, when congestion is minimized. As long as the
adversary does not take out mixes the latency of the system
thus increases linearly with the amount of traffic. Our protocol
is a medium-latency anonymous communication network and
thus can be deployed for applications that are more tolerant
to latency such as anonymous wiki, micro-blogging, voting,
and auctions. Note that for application such as voting with
homomorphic tallying the decryption phase of our protocol
may not be necessary for all messages.
Load Balancing: Since, our MPR protocol offers load
balancing the messages leaving the system have a more
uniform anonymity set size compared to mixnets using source
routing because in source routing the routes are selected with-
out considering load balancing. This increases the minimum
anonymity that a message can achieve.
Limitation As mentioned before, MPR addresses the scal-
ability issue of source routing in terms of not requiring to
maintain a complete system view for users. Growing our
system is, however, not as scalable as growing a system with
a free topology because the system’s throughput can be only
expanded by adding mixes to all layers, while if there is no
restrictions for selecting a relay and the routing can choose
any relay in the system adding a single relay increases the
system’s overall throughput.
VII. CONCLUSION
We proposed a novel routing approach, called multiparty
routing, to carry out secure routing for anonymous com-
munication networks. More concretely, our MPR protocol
achieves routing integrity, routing correctness, load balancing,
in addition to anonymity, and is relatively scalable.
We leave as future work a full implementation of our
protocol and the addition of resilience mechanism against
failing mixes explained in the security analysis. Moreover, we
leave as an open question measurements of the performance
and resilience of our system under DoS attacks.
APPENDIX
In this section, we give instantions of routing assignment
and routing verification.
A. Routing Assignment
To route a ciphertext, at each layer, a relay is assigned to
the ciphertext using a mapping function. The mapping function
is composed of a permutation function keyed by the jointly
generated random number Rand and a load-balancing function
that distributes ciphertext based on the throughput of relays in
the next layer.
The permutation algorithm is the function H out of hash
function h. H is applied iteratively on the inputs: joint random
number Rand and the ciphertext indexes 1, . . . , w and returns
the permuted indexes z1, . . . , zw. To realize the permutation
functionality we have to avoid hash function collisions by
Algorithm 2 Permuting with Jointly Obtained Rand
H(Rand, 1, ..., w)
Z = ∅
i = 1
for i = 1 to w
j = 0
zi = h(Rand‖i‖j)
while zi ∈ Z
j = j + 1
zi = h(Rand‖i‖j)
end while
Z ← Z ∪ zi
end for
output(z1, . . . , zw)
Algorithm 3 Mapping ciphertexts
Map(z1, ..., zw, r1, ..., rk, b1, ..., bk)
B =SUM(b1, ..., bk)
for j = 1 to k
rj fetch w ∗ bj/B ciphertexts from bulletin board
end for
Assigns ciphertext to mixes in proportion to the mixes through-
put.
performing a check of membership on a set Z of already
computed index values.
We apply the mapping function Map, e.g., Algorithm 3 in
appendices, to make the assignment of the permuted ciphertext
(indexed by H) to the relays in the next layer in proportion to
their throughput. We refer to the throughput of relays by b,
where throughput refers to the number of messages it can route
in proportion to all the number of message that can be routed
by a layer and the throughput of a single layer is denoted B.
For this purpose we use the function fetch, which ciphertexts
to mixes in the next layer. These relays fetch the ciphertext that
is assigned to them as their input from the bulletin board.
B. Routing Verification
Let Cr refer to the set of input ciphertext that relay r has
submitted and signed and C ′r to the set of output ciphertexts
that relay r has submitted and signed. Moreover, let us denote
the ctr-th layer of routers in our system by Rctr.
Then all the auditors must carry out the routing verifi-
cation as described below. Our algorithm applies a Boolean
VerifyRand function which simply verifies both the cor-
rectness of the opening os the commitments Com(rand) with
regard to the actual rand on the bulletin board and checks
that their sum equals Rand. Moreover, the algorithm verifies
whether the input of all relays in the ctr + 1 layer is correct
according to the output ciphertexts of relays in layer ctr and
their corresponding Rands.
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